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Social Security Replacement Rates  
For Own Earnings Benchmarks 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell and John W. R. Phillips 
 
From the early days of US Social Security retirement program operations, policymakers 
have sought to balance the system’s twin goals of earnings replacement and welfare or income 
redistribution. The earnings replacement objective motivates making retiree benefit payments a 
function of lifetime earnings. The redistributive goal is seeks to provide a relatively higher 
benefit formula to those workers having relatively lower lifetime earnings.   
Over the years, policy analysts have periodically generated measures of “Social Security 
replacement rates” that assess how program benefits relate to workers’ earnings levels.   These 
measures have often been used as a means of assessing how effectively the program replaces 
workers’ pay, and when computed for workers of different pay levels, they have also been used 
to evaluate the redistributive aspect of the U.S. Social Security program. Further, policymakers 
tend to use replacement rates to assess the likely impact of alternative system reforms, as in the 
case of the recent Commission to Strengthen Social Security (c.f. Cogan and Mitchell 2003).1 
Despite the myriad ways in which the replacement rate concept is used, there is no single 
commonly agreed-on definition of the term, or exactly what it is intended to capture.2  In what 
follows, we first review previous formulates of the concept, and then we employ data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS)to evaluate how Social Security benefit replacement rates 
differ for a range of hypothetical and actual earning profiles. We find that replacement rates 
based on individual earnings lead to higher replacement rates for workers with the median HRS 
profile compared to the SSA medium scaled profile: the HRS worker would be estimated to 
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receive benefits worth 55% of lifetime average earnings, versus 48% for the medium 
hypothetical earner. However, replacement rates that relate individual benefits to population 
average earnings (current or backward looking) produce higher replacement rated for 
hypothetical workers relative to the median HRS profile.  Since US policymakers tend to prefer a 
replacement rate measure tied to workers’ own past earnings, our results suggest that the 
replacement rates produced by hypothetical profiles imply lower earnings replacement in 
retirement than the calculated results for actual HRS earners. 
 
Prior Studies3 
In the US context, the Committee on Economic Security highlighted the concept of a 
replacement rate when it developed the Social Security system for Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
Administration in 1935. Committee members held that “payment of benefits at a rate . . . 
approximating 50 percent of previous average earnings is socially desirable,” though the group 
supplied no justification for that particular threshold, nor did it stipulate whether workers’ own 
lifetime earnings or some larger economy-wide average should be the proper benchmark.  In the 
very influential textbook Fundamentals of Private Pensions, Dan McGill (1964) three decades 
later wrote that a worker’s retirement income, net of taxes, should be “approximately equivalent 
to the worker's spendable wages (gross wages less income tax and deductions for OASDI and 
private employee benefit plans) prior to retirement.”  In other words, he proposed a roughly a 
100% net replacement rate, looking backward at the individual’s own pay. Clarity retreated the 
next year when, in 1965, Congress passed the Older Americans’ Act.4 Among other things, this 
bill held that older persons should receive “an adequate income in retirement in accordance with 
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the American standard of living.” But it was left for subsequent analysts to clarify what this 
meant.  
In 1980, Meier et al. (1980) recommended that the “implicit or explicit goal is the 
maintenance of preretirement standards of living.” Dexter (1984) made this concrete with a 
Replacement Ratio (RR) defined as the ratio of retiree income to pre-retirement earnings. Yet he 
implemented this with a cross-section dataset, the 1973 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), 
where he compared older retirees’ consumption levels with workers’ earnings in the cross-
section (McGill et al. 2004). The analysis reported that the replacement ratio fell for those at 
higher pre-retirement income levels, though these were not the identical individuals followed 
through time. Subsequent analyses of retirement preparedness in the US context have also tended 
to use cross-sectional databases to compare retirement benefits in payment status, vis-à-vis 
earnings of those pre-retirement.  In a series of studies alone and with Aon Consulting, Palmer 
used cross-sections of the CEX to develop replacement rate measures netting out taxes (and in 
some variants, work-related expenses). As McGill et al. (2004) note, the instability in results 
across years -- even for a hypothetical married man assumed to retire at age 65 with a spouse 
three years younger – makes the results difficult to generalize.  A more recent study by Bosworth 
et al. (1991) compared results using several cross-sections of the CEX and Surveys of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), and it again reported some discrepancies in saving rates.5  
Relatively few studies thus far have had the opportunity to track individual workers’ 
actual earnings patterns when constructing benchmarks for replacement ratio measures.6 
Nevertheless, that is what is needed to determine whether alternative pre-retirement pay 
benchmarks affect replacement rate computations. Bosworth et al (2000) did use a panel, 
the1990-1993 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to Social Security 
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Earnings Records (SSER). But instead of devising ‘own replacement rates’ using lifetime 
earnings patterns of individuals, that study instead developed a typology of earnings patterns.7  
Only the work by Mitchell and Moore (2001; Moore and Mitchell 2000) used an early wave of 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to Social Security earnings records to evaluate 
individual households’ retirement wealth adequacy as compared to the same individuals’ own 
pre-retirement household income. That work, however, focused exclusively on workers’ pre-
retirement earnings and did not compute alternative replacement rate measures using lifetime 
earnings as benchmarks.8 In the next section we explore alternative measures linking benefit 
estimates to workers’ own pay levels. 
 
Alternative Earnings Benchmarks 
Some analysts provide measures of Social Security benefit replacement rates by 
comparing benefit entitlements for workers with “hypothetical” or illustrative pay profiles. In 
this section we first describe the hypothetical profiles developed by the Office of the Actuary at 
Social Security (OACT) and compare these with the actual profiles we have derived from a set of 
cohorts covered by the Health and Retirement Study. Our goal is to create alternative earnings 
benchmarks that can be used at the denominator for alternative replacement rate measures of 
interest.  
Social Security Hypothetical Workers.  The best-known hypothetical earnings provided in SSA 
reports are the “low/medium/high” pay trajectories developed by the Office of the Actuary.  
These have been used by the agency for various purposes, including the assessment of internal 
rates of return for hypothetical pay profiles under current and alternative social security rules. 
Initially, three steady earnings profiles were devised: one hypothetical case was assumed to 
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receive average annual covered earnings each year; one always had half the average covered 
earnings level; and one was at the maximum covered earnings cap in all years.9  Figure 1 depicts 
the low and high pay levels, as well as the Average Wage Index (AWI) representing the medium 
pay profile, are given in nominal and real (inflation corrected) terms.10  Subsequent refinements 
of the prototypical approach embedded a set of scaling factors to take into account the fact that 
real-world workers do not always receive exactly the low, medium, high, or maximum pay levels 
in all years of life. These scaled profiles are represented in Figure 2 (see the Appendix for further 
discussion of how these are derived).   
Figures 1 and 2 here  
Actual Earnings Profiles in the HRS. In our own research, we have used data from the Health 
and Retirement Study to examine lifetime pay profiles of actual workers (Mitchell and Phillips, 
2004). For the purposes of analysis we linked the administrative records on lifetime earnings 
with the information provided in the main core of the 2004 HRS, to yield data needed to compute 
benefit entitlements and benefit levels.11  There we showed that, on average, actual HRS workers 
have substantially lower earnings paths than the medium OACT hypothetical profile.  We now 
extend the analysis by relying on the actual earnings profiles reported for the median 10% 
worker in the HRS and compute for this individual his expected benefits (given the relevant 
Social Security benefit formula).12  We then compare the actual replacement rates with those 
generated for the OACT hypothetical profiles. The goal is to use these alternative pay patterns to 
assess how sensitive different replacement rate definitions are to distinct pay benchmarks.   
 
Findings for Alternative Replacement Rates  
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Retiree replacement rates can be computed using many different denominators, as there is 
no clear guidance on what one might want to use as the benchmark earnings measure. 
Accordingly, we propose four “backward-looking” alternatives and one contemporaneous 
measure to see what difference these measures might make for the purpose of replacement rate 
calculations. Specifically, the backward-looking metrics express estimated retirement benefits 
for each of the illustrative workers by four different denominators: 
(1) The worker’s own pre-retirement pay averaged over the five years prior to retirement;   
(2)  The worker’s own average lifetime pay in inflation-corrected dollars;  
(3)  The worker’s own average indexed monthly earnings in real terms;  
(4)  The average (real) earnings of all workers employed in that year, for each year in the past.  
In addition, we compute what the benefit replacement rate is contemporaneously; that is, 
comparing the benefit to average (real) earnings of all current workers. This latter measure is 
commonly used in Europe, where retirement adequacy is often judged according to whether 
retirees maintain a given relative position vis-à-vis current working cohorts. We do this for the 
three stylized OACT profiles, as well as for the HRS median 10% worker for the 1936 cohort.13  
Results appear in Figure 3 which plots the low, medium, and high scaled SSA earnings 
contours against the median HRS worker in our sample. We also depict the earnings patterns of 
the fully insured population, which has worked long enough to be entitled to receive benefits, 
and compare it to the general population. Based on our prior work, we expect and find that the 
fully insured profile is higher than the average worker, and we confirm that both the medium and 
the high SSA profiles are almost always quite a bit above the HRS trend lines.  
Figure 3 here 
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The graph in Figure 4 shows how the Social Security Primary Insurance Amount at the 
full retirement age (PIA) changes in real terms for additional years of work. This takes into 
account the fact that the benefit formula indexed earnings to the average wage index that year.  It 
is interesting that the trends are so flat – that is, workers receive relatively little additional change 
in expected benefits for more years of contributions (after contributing for the basic 10 years 
required for eligibility).  It is also worth noting that the median HRS earner who was fully 
insured for benefits would be entitled to about $9,000 versus $12,000 for the SSA “medium” 
worker, and the broader sample of HRS respondents would be down around $8,000 (per year, in 
2004 dollars).  This is not surprising given our results from Figure 3 where the hypothetical 
medium scaled profile lies above the HRS profiles at almost all ages. 
Figure 4 here 
Next we display replacement rates for the five illustrative cases using a range of 
alternative earnings patterns in the denominators.  Figure 5 indicates replacement rates using as a 
benchmark the worker’s own lifetime earnings indexed to average wages in the economy (his 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings or AIME annualized).  Here we see that the replacement 
rates computed for HRS workers are initially below, and later in life somewhat above, those 
evaluated for the medium scaled SSA profile. While they differ less than the earnings profiles 
might have led one to believe, it is still true that the median HRS fully insured worker would 
anticipate a benefit replacement rate of 51% versus 48% for the medium scaled worker (if we 
include all workers, not just the fully insured, the replacement rate is 55%). The first row of 
Table 1 summarizes the replacement rate measures for each earnings profile, for that cohort’s 
normal retirement age. Figure 6 shows the replacement rate path if, instead, we were to compare 
Social Security benefits to national average wages when the worker retired, in the European 
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variant of replacement rates mentioned above. Using average earnings in 2000 as the benchmark, 
we see that the scaled medium SSA path generates a benefit ratio of around 40% and standing at 
42% at retirement, whereas the HRS median worker’s replacement ratio falls below this target, 
standing at 33% at the end of the work life. Again, ratios as of the normal retirement date are 
presented in Table 1. 
Figures 5 and 6 here, and Table 1 
  The Table also summarizes results for the other replacement rates, and the degree of 
variability is quite interesting. Focusing on the figures from the hypothetical earnings profiles, 
replacement rates range in the 42-54% range for the medium profile, but there is a much wider 
range for the low-earner profile (25-73%), and high-earner (40-61%). Turning to the HRS 
findings, the first two measures which tie benefits to own earnings measures yield higher 
replacement rates than one would see using the hypothetical profiles: for instance, the median 
HRS profile would have benefits worth 55% of AIME and lifetime average real earnings, versus 
48% for the SSA figures. Interestingly the ratio falls to 41% for last five earnings years, 
reflective of the fact that HRS workers’ pay continued to rise in real terms (whereas the SSA 
figures assume no real increases). The lowest replacement rates for the HRS profiles appear in 
measures that use national average earnings (the last two rows); for instance retirees from this 
cohort anticipated benefits only worth about 33-37% of national pay levels. By sharp contrast, 
benefit replacement ratios for the highly paid scaled hypothetical paths are very high (56-60%). 
Evidently, the choice of benchmark can dramatically alter replacement rate results for the 
‘median’ worker, and also for workers in the below and above average pay groupings.  
Historically in the US, policymakers have tended to prefer a replacement rate measure tied to 
workers’ own past earnings. Using that metric, we conclude that replacement rates are higher 
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when one uses “actual worker” earnings patterns instead of scaled illustrative hypothetical 
earnings paths. 
   
Conclusions 
Social Security reform proposals are often presented in terms of their differential impacts 
on hypothetical workers for a variety of earnings profiles. Our work explores how different 
concepts of replacement rates influence benefit outcomes, and how in turn these are associated 
with reported retiree wellbeing. We find that replacement rates for the median real world worker 
as represented in the nationally representative Health and Retirement Study are generally higher 
than for the medium scale profile developed by SSA.  We also show that a replacement rate 
measure linking benefits to national average wages at retirement generate a more modest 
replacement rate, about 33% for the median HRS worker, instead of the higher rates often 
discussed in policy circles. More precise analyses of possible distributional patterns from Social 
Security reform proposals would follow, if benefit estimates were derived from actual earnings 
profiles rather than hypothetical scaled patterns.14  
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Figure 1:  Low/Average/High Steady SSA Earnings Profiles (1951-2001) 
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Source: Mitchell, Phillips, and Au (in progress)
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Figure 2: Scaled Steady SSA Earnings Profiles: Age 21 in 1951 
(A) Scaled Profiles for Hypothetical Worker age 21 in 1951: 
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Source: Mitchell, Phillips, and Au (in progress). 
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Figure 3. HRS Earnings by Age and Earnings Profile 
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Note: HRS 1936 Birth Cohort median 10% shown. Source: Authors’ computations.  
Figure 4. Levels of PIA by Age and Earnings Profile 
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Note: HRS 1936 Birth Cohort median 10% shown. Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Figure 5:   AIME Replacement Rates by Age and Earnings Profile 
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Figure 6.  National Average Wage (2000) Replacement Rates by Age and Earnings Profile 
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Note: HRS 1936 Birth Cohort median 10% shown. Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Figure 7. Lifetime Average Earnings Replacement Rates from Benefits  
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Note: HRS 1936 Birth Cohort median 10% shown. Source: Authors’ calculations   
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Table 1. Replacement Rates for Different Earnings Profiles  
 
SSA Scaled Profiles HRS 10% 
Replacement Rate Measure 
Low Medium High 
HRS 
Med 
HRS 
FI 
Average Indexed Annual Earnings ($2004) 64.9% 48.1% 39.9% 54.6% 51.0% 
Lifetime Average Earnings 65.9% 48.8% 40.5% 55.6% 52.2% 
Average Earnings Last 5 Pre-Retire Yrs 72.7% 53.8% 44.7% 40.8% 39.6% 
National Average Earnings 1957-2000 27.8% 45.7% 60.7% 35.2% 40.0% 
National Average Earnings 2000 25.6% 42.2% 56.1% 32.5% 36.9% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: 
HRS Median 10% earnings are based on authors’ calculations as described in the text for the 1936 Birth Cohort; the 
HRS FI figures are based on the fully insured population only. 
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Appendix.  Derivation of Social Security Hypothetical Earnings Profiles15 
 
As per Mitchell et al. (in progress), we draw our evidence for the real-world earnings profiles 
from a nationally representative survey of respondents to the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), linked with tax records from administrative sources.  These we compare with the 
hypothetical profiles devised by SSA for illustrative purposes. This note summarizes the 
complex method by which the SSA profiles are developed.  
 
Derivation of the Average Wage Index (AWI). The SSA derives illustrative workers by 
starting with the Average Wage Index, a series originally drawn from first-quarter covered 
earnings data gathered by SSA from 1973-77, multiplied by 4 to get annualized earnings, and 
divided by the number of taxpaying workers in that period. Because similar records were 
unavailable prior to 1973, data extracts were used to track average covered earnings for 1951-72 
(before that time, earnings were not tracked yearly by SSA). To avoid jumps in the series when 
the data sources changed, the agency used the pre-1973 changes to backward-index the base 
period AWI from 1973.  In 1977 and 1978, the SSA began to rely on earnings reported in 
personal income tax forms (Form 1040); thereafter, earnings data derived from Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Wage and Tax Statements (“W-2 forms”) were used.  Once again, instead of using 
16actual annual earnings to compute actual AWI earnings levels, the new data sources were used 
to compute changes to inflate the base year AWI computed in the early 1970s (Clingman and 
Kunkel, 1992). 
 
Hypothetical Steady and Scaled Earning Profiles:  Several hypothetical “steady” profiles were 
developed by the SSA, on the presumption that each hypothetical worker entered the workforce 
at age 22 and remained continuously employed until age 65 (except for periods of disability). 
The “average steady” profile assumes the AWI throughout the lifetime; the “low steady” profile 
is assumed to earn only 45 percent of the AWI in all years; and the “high steady” profile is 
associated with pay at 160 percent of the AWI (Nichols et al., 2001).  As the steady profiles 
ignored earnings and employment fluctuations, the SSA also created “scaled” profiles seeking to 
better reflect actual earning patterns over the lifecycle. The process of ‘scaling’ the AWI data 
involves three complex steps including (a) the development of “raw” scaled factors from a 
dataset on fully insured workers; (b) the implementation of a consistency adjustment; and (c) the 
determination of annual scaled earnings using “final” scaled factors. The net effect is to have 
scaled earnings rise with age, though the computation continues to assume that people enter the 
workforce at age 21 and remain rather tightly attached to the labor force until retirement, 
disability, or death.   In real terms, the “medium” scaled profile has earnings worth one-third the 
AWI during the early phase of the work life, one-quarter higher than the AWI in middle age, and 
one-third less than the AWI in later life. While the scaled profiles do factor in an empirically-
based age-linked life-cycle earnings profile, they only “count” the fully insured population, and 
the factors rely on a 10-year data window. Accordingly they will not represent any given 
cohort’s actual age-earnings patterns.    
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Endnotes 
1 The Pozen plan for “progressive indexing” was also assessed using this approach. .   
2 We abstract here from absolute income standards such as the poverty line, discussed in some 
detail in McGill et al (2994), Chapter 19.  
3 This section draws heavily on McGill et al. (2004).  
4 PL 89-73, July 4, 1965 
5 Schieber (2004) and Vanderhei (2004) offer more complete discussions about medical care 
costs, work-related expenses, and other factors that analysts might want to subtract from gross 
income to arrive at net income measures for replacement rate purposes. In the present context, 
however, we concentrate on different benefits versus longitudinal gross earnings measure. 
6 Schieber (2004) has a useful review of adequacy measures including utility-based formulations, 
which are not the focus of the present paper.  
7 Butrica et al. (2003-4) also use this linked data, but they project future cohort wellbeing derived 
from the MINT model.  
8 Scholz et al. (2003) also uses the HRS to assess retirement saving adequacy compared to 
workers’ earnings. However they do not compute conventional retirement replacement ratios as 
we do here.  
9 See the Appendix for a discussion of how the AWI is computed.  
10 A fourth illustrative pay profile between those of the average earner and the one always at the 
maximum earnings level was added by the 1994-1996 Advisory Council. 
11 We make use of statistical methods described in our prior study to address earnings over the 
taxable maximum in the years uncovered by the W2 earnings data (1951-1979).   
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12 We use administrative data provided by linked records for the median 10-percentile worker 
(the average of the 45th to 55th percentiles of the distribution) in the HRS focusing on the 1936 
birth cohort. As linked data are available under restricted data conditions only to 1991, we 
extend the real earnings series for the median earner to age 64 using the algorithm developed in 
Mitchell et al. (2001): EarnFactor = (EarnAge50*5) + (EarnAge49*4) + (EarnAge48*3) + 
(EarnAge47*2) + (EarnAge46*1). We also assume that the AWI going forward would rise at a 
real 1% per annum. 
13 Inasmuch as each birth cohort has its own AWI series and benefit formulas can change from 
one cohort to the next, we present comparable figures computed for the given cohort rather than 
mixing birth-years across the figures.  
14 For example, proposals to implement personal accounts in social security have emphasized 
retirement security for those at the bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution (Cogan and 
Mitchell, 2003). 
15 This section draws from Mitchell, Phillips, and Au (in progress). 
 
